Dr. Owen Gingerich is a retired Harvard professor of Astronomy and the History of Science. He is widely recognized as an authority on both the astronomers Johannes Kepler and Nicholas Copernicus. His 2004 book, The Book that Nobody Read: Chasing the Revolutions of Nicolaus Copernicus (Walker & Co.), for example, is an account of his three decade long study in which he sought out and examined 580 sixteenth-century copies of Copernicus’s masterpiece, De revolutionibus, in libraries throughout the world. In 2005, Gingerich delivered the William Belden Noble Lectures at Harvard (held in the Memorial Church) in a three part series that he titled “God’s Universe.” The small, almost pocket-sized book by the same name, is a faithful translation of those lectures into prose.
Gingerich, as a Christian, makes it clear that he believes in a universe that “has been created with intention and purpose” and additionally, “that this belief does not interfere with the scientific enterprise” (pg. 7). Readers not already familiar with Gingerich may be somewhat surprised to learn that he does not support the so-called Intelligent Design movement or its politics as exemplified by the Dover, PA, trial in 2005. Rather, Gingerich labels the movement as “misguided when presented as an alternative to the naturalistic explanations offered by science, which do not explicitly require the hand of God” (Ibid.). Gingerich is not interested in bringing supernatural explanations into the domain of science because science works under a constrained framework. Instead, he is more interested in explaining how scientists can maintain a belief in God or purpose in the universe while continuing to do good and productive science.
In the first part, titled “Is Mediocrity a Good Idea?” Gingerich asks a simple question: “Why is the water in the teakettle boiling?” One, of course, could give a strictly scientific answer that explains how the heat’s energy excites the water molecules, causing them to move faster and faster until a few eventually escape the surface of the water and become a gas. One could also answer the question by simply stating that the water in the teakettle is boiling because we want some tea. Here Gingerich is making the important distinction between what Aristotle identified as efficient causes and final causes. An efficient cause explains how something happens, while a final cause explains why something happens. In other words, final causes are concerned with purpose. The teakettle boils for the purpose of providing us with some tea. He then notes that the Scientific Revolution of the 17th century marked a point in which final causes were slowly abandoned from scientific discourse. Scientists attempt to uncover how the universe works by unraveling a coherent picture of cause and effect. Efficient cause is the language of science.
At the same time, Gingerich, like any reasonable person, is also interested in the why of the universe. While science gives us a fairly coherent view of how the universe arrived at its present state after roughly 13.7 billion years of stellar evolution, it does not (and cannot) explain why it exists as it does in the first place. Gingerich introduces readers to what’s called the “Copernican Principle,” which is simply the principle of mediocrity. In other words, following Copernicus, humans were faced with the idea that we are not so special or unique in the universe after all. Earth is just a mediocre planet revolving around a mediocre sun in a mediocre solar system on the fringe of a mediocre galaxy that is just one among billions of others. The point here, as far as Gingerich is concerned, is that he rejects the principle of mediocrity in the sense that he believes that humans do hold a special place in the cosmos because “belief in a final cause, a Creator-God, gives a coherent understanding of why the universe seems so congenially designed for the existence of intelligent, self-reflective life” (pg. 12).
Elsewhere, he writes, “For me the universe is a more coherent and congenial place if I assume that it embodies purpose and intention” (pg. 41). Gingerich is careful here, and this is one of the strengths of this book, in pointing out that he is not trying to prove that a Creator exists, rather, he is merely stating that by assuming a Creator, the universe is more intelligible. “I do not claim that these considerations are proof for the existence of a Creator; I claim only that to me, the universe makes sense with this understanding” (pg. 12). What is it specifically about the universe that makes it more “coherent” if a Creator of some sort is assumed? After all, it is self-evident that the universe feels more congenial when one believes that it was expressly created because that implies that we are here for some reason. Of course that makes our situation seem more agreeable than the alternative – that there is no particular reason why we exist. Yet we must keep in mind that how we feel about the nature of our reality should have no bearing on what we think is true about that reality. The fact that the universe would be a more congenial place if we assumed a Creator behind it all does not justify making that assumption.
This is where the so-called anthropic coincidences come to the rescue, so to speak. As an astronomer, Gingerich understands that the numerous physical constants of nature seemed “fine-tuned” in the sense that if just one of them was a different value, life as we know it could not exist in this universe. Gingerich is convinced that the only satisfactory answer for why so many physical constants seem fine-tuned is that they are fine-tuned – they were explicitly designed for the purpose of creating a universe that could one day be hospitable to intelligent and self-reflecting homo sapiens. If faced with the alternative, that the physical constants all by chance accidently settled on this narrow range of “correct” values in a coincidence that is enormously improbable, then Gingerich’s explanation sounds reasonable, doesn’t it?
The anthropic principle is perhaps the most compelling argument for a cosmic designer. However, its appeal seems to only extend out to those individuals who already believe in God in the first place. As a Christian, Gingerich believes in a God who purposefully created the universe in such a way that intelligent beings like ourselves could one day readily appear. The fact that the fundamental laws underlying the universe undoubtedly allow that to happen fits neatly into this view. This is where, as Gingerich would say, our physics (description of the universe) leaves off and we enter metaphysics, or how we interpret the universe that physics has discovered for us.
So, back to the question, does Owen’s universe give us a more coherent understanding of the anthropic principle? I don’t believe that it does. That doesn’t mean that he is wrong and that I am right. What it means is that we both maintain different metaphysical stances. In other words, we interpret the facts as we know them quite differently. As far as the physical constants go, I do not believe that we know enough about the fundamental laws of nature to conclude how probable it is or isn’t that they turned out a specific way. Perhaps the “alternative” mentioned above isn’t the only alternative after all – maybe the fundamental laws of nature are just that, fundamental, and don’t have a cause at all. After all, if we assume that the fundamental constants of nature needed to be tuned by a mysterious Creator, what about the Creator? Surely this entity must exist, if it exists at all, within a context that has its own fundamental laws. Why do those laws allow a Creator with enough power and intelligence to design an entire universe to exist at all? Is the Creator benevolent, malevolent, or indifferent? Gingerich does not address questions like these. Indeed, it seems to me that the postulated Creator is intentionally left as vague and context-free. While it may be satisfying for Gingerich to attribute the fundamental laws that bound our existence to a Creator that isn’t, apparently, bound by any particular laws at all, I do not find that satisfying. It’s not really an explanation because it does not explain how any of this came to be created. If ultimate reality doesn’t stop with our universe, whether there’s an incomprehensible Creator or an infinite number of bubble universes in a grand multiverse, I suspect that homo sapiens will never know for sure.
While the search for purpose through the structure of the universe may not appeal to everyone, there are some more good points in this book that I would like to mention briefly. In the section titled, “Dare a Scientist Believe in Design?” Gingerich argues that what one believes metaphysically about the universe – divine design or purposelessness accident – should not affect how one goes about actually doing science, because science can only concern itself with efficient causes. He writes that “Science will not collapse if some practitioners are convinced that there has occasionally been creative input into the long chain of being. Are mutations blind chance, or is God’s miraculous hand continually at work, disguised in the ambiguity of the uncertainty principle?” (pg. 70). Elsewhere he writes, “It is a matter of belief or ideology how we choose to think about the universe, and it will make no difference how we do our science…Either way, the scientist with theistic metaphysics will approach laboratory problems in much the same way as will his atheistic colleague across the hall” (pgs. 101-102). This is true to the extent that scientists make an honest attempt to adhere to methodological naturalism, or the principle that science can only seek natural explanations for natural phenomenon.
By not adhering to this principle, Gingerich finds the current Intelligent Design movement, as previously noted, to be misguided. While he nonetheless agrees with their conclusions with regards to final causes, “they fall short in supplying any mechanisms to serve as the efficient causes that primarily engage scientists in our age” (pg. 73). Intelligent Design does not explain, for example, “the temporal or geographical distribution of species” or the intricacy of DNA coding anymore than “God’s will” provides an efficient explanation for why objects fall to the ground or the planets orbit the sun.
In God’s Universe, Gingerich has not provided any new or compelling arguments for the skeptic and nonbeliever to convert to his particular metaphysical view, and he certainly doesn’t attempt to logically connect his Creator God with the God of Christianity. Believers, on the other hand, will not find much difficulty embracing it. Nevertheless, this book is certainly valuable for its critique of Intelligent Design from someone who believes in intelligent design (lower-case i, lower-case d), and his discussion of the demarcation between scientific explanations and metaphysical explanations is especially important. Can a scientist believe in divine design? Owen Gingerich is certainly a great example of how a modern scientist can both practice sound science and believe in an intelligent designer, regardless of whether or not you find his arguments persuasive. When it comes down to it, Gingerich readily admits that “probably it takes the eyes of faith to accept that idea” (pg. 77). That I accept.
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